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Abstract In the 1980s and 1990s the US employment rate increased steadily, and by 2000 it was 
one of the highest among the rich democratic nations. Since then it has declined both in absolute 
terms and relative to other countries. We use an in- depth comparison between the United States 
and the United Kingdom to probe the causes of America's poor recent performance. Contrary to a 
common narrative, a comparative perspective suggests that the decline in US labour force participa-
tion is not confined to the (white) male population; the divergence in the female participation rate is 
even more pronounced. We do not find evidence that the poor US performance is linked to cyclical 
patterns, such as the 2008–09 Great Recession; instead, it is a more pervasive, longer- run phenom-
enon. The relative decline of US participation rates compared to the UK is attributable to shifts in 
socio- demographic characteristics, such as education, and to shifts in the impact of those characteris-
tics, which have become more adverse to participation.
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1. Introduction
Labour force participation in the United States increased steadily in the 1980s and 1990s. However, it 
declined between 2000 and 2007 and then fell even more sharply in the Great Recession. Macroeco-
nomic recovery saw unemployment fall rapidly from 2011, but the participation rate has only increased 
modestly, remaining well below its pre- crisis level and even further below its late- 1990s peak. An 
expanding research literature has advanced a range of explanations for this dramatic reversal in what 
not long ago was known as the 'great American jobs machine' (The Economist, 2000).
The US experience since 2000 contrasts sharply with what has happened in the United Kingdom. 
There, labour force participation was fairly stable in the decade up to the onset of the Great Recession, 
fell by much less during the crisis, and since 2012 has been rising significantly. These two countries 
have many features in common, including deregulated labour markets and independent currencies. 
And both had a comparatively high participation rate at the end of the 1990s. Given the divergence 
in participation rates since 2000 and through the crisis and recovery periods, comparison of these 
two cases can provide a helpful perspective on the US story. We exploit this comparative potential, 
analysing the two countries' experiences over recent decades through a common analytical lens and 
assessing hypotheses about key drivers of stagnant labour force participation in the US in that light.
We focus on three questions: Does the gap between the two countries lie mainly with men or 
women? How much of the gap is a product of structural factors as opposed to cyclical ones? And how 
much do structural shifts reflect changes in composition as opposed to changes in behaviours?
We find that male labour force participation rates are trending downwards in both countries, but 
the trend is stronger in the US. Female participation is also a major part of the story, with rates for 
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later cohorts trending upward in the UK while downward in the US. Structural shifts have been more 
important than cyclical patterns. The ageing of the baby boom generation has a greater impact in 
the US than the UK, because participation rates decline with age more steeply in the US and its baby 
boom generation was a relatively high- participation generation. Alongside compositional change, 
aspects of behaviour of the US population have become comparatively less favourable to participa-
tion. There was little difference in participation between the two countries in the decade from the mid- 
1990s because composition and behavioural differences roughly offset one another. The marked gap 
observed more recently, by contrast, reflects both composition differences and behaviour becoming 
less favourable to participation in the US compared with the UK.
Section two describes trends in labour force participation, employment, and unemployment rates 
in the two countries over recent decades. Section three reviews existing explanations for these trends. 
Section four outlines our empirical strategy, and section five presents the results. Section six sets the 
findings from our US- UK comparison in broader comparative context.
2. Recent trends in labour force participation and 
employment
Figure 1 shows the labour force participation rate — the share of the working- age population, defined 
as ages 15–64, who are either in paid work or unemployed — in the US and the UK since 1984. (We 
take 1984 as initial year at this point for data comparability reasons.) Up to the early 1990s, both coun-
tries saw substantial increases in the participation rate, with the UK rate about one percentage point 
higher and peaking at almost 78% in 1990. The UK level then dipped in the early 1990s and remained 
at about 76% to 2000., whereas in the US the participation rate rose to reach 77.5% in the ‘Clinton 
boom’ of the second half of the 1990s, and was still at that peak entering 2000.
However, the US rate then declined to about 75% in the years up to the 2008–09 global financial 
crisis, before falling much more sharply during and after the Great Recession to hit a low of 72% in 
2015. Recovery since that low point has been modest, with the participation rate in late 2017 only 
73%. In the UK, on the other hand, the participation rate remained at about 76%–77% up to the onset 
of the Great Recession, did not fall below 76% even in the depths of the crisis, and bounced back 
quite quickly so that by late 2017 it was approaching 79%. The gap between the two countries in 2017 
was six percentage points.
The business cycle dynamics of the two countries in terms of unemployment are rather similar 
since 2000, fluctuating more in the US up to and through the crisis but then converging. The major 
Figure 1. Labour force participation rates. Population aged 15–64. Data source: OECD.
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differences in participation rates between the two countries since 2000 are to be seen not in their 
unemployment experiences but with respect to employment versus inactivity. Figure 2 shows that 
the UK employment rate was stable at about 71% from 2000 up to the Great Recession, and then 
fell by more than two percentage points before recovering from 2012 to now reach 74%. In the US, 
by contrast, the employment rate declined quite sharply in the early 2000s, then fell by almost five 
percentage points during the early years of the crisis, twice as much as in the UK. While employment 
picked up from 2012 onwards, by 2017 it was still only about 70%, compared to 72% in 2007. Having 
been nearly three percentage points higher than the UK in 2000, this left the US employment rate four 
percentage points below the UK in 2017. So from 2000 to the present, the share of the working- age 
population in paid work in the US contracted, and the percentage inactive expanded, by about four 
percentage points. Over the same period, the percentage at work in the UK rose by two percentage 
Figure 2. Employment rates. Population aged 15–64. Data source: OECD.
Figure 3. Male labour force participation rate by age group Data source: OECD.
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points. This is the key difference underlying the contrasting evolution of their labour force participa-
tion rates.
The falling participation rate in the US is often discussed as mainly relating to men (eg, Eberstadt, 
2016), or even as concentrated among middle- aged men. However, the comparative patterns for the 
participation rate since 1984 disaggregated by gender and age group, shown in Figure 3 for men 
and Figure 4 for women, tell a different story. They show participation rates in the US from 2000 
falling substantially for men in each age group up to 54, with those over 60 being the only ones to 
see an increase. For women up to age 50 there is also some decline over that period, though much 
less pronounced than for men and varying across age groups. What is striking, though, is that for men 
the decline since 2000 represents a continuation of a longer- term trend (albeit accelerated during the 
crisis), whereas for women it is a reversal of the upward trajectory seen up to that point. In the UK, by 
contrast, the male participation rate also declined up to 2000 for most age groups, but by 2017 it was 
generally as high as in 2000 or higher (except for youngest age group), and the rate for women aged 
25 or over has continued to rise. As a result, participation rates are now higher in the UK than the US 
for both men and women in each age group up to the age of 60.
3. Existing research
The decline in the US labour force participation rate since the turn of the millennium has fuelled 
a vigorous debate about the extent to which this primarily reflects cyclical forces or longer- lasting 
structural factors, and about the nature of those factors. An early paper by Aaronson et al. (2006) 
concluded that cyclical fluctuations in participation were taking place around a declining trend. In 
the wake of the financial crisis, Aronson et al. (2012) and Van Zandweghe (2012) concluded that 
more than half of the decline in aggregate US labour force participation from 2000–2011 was due to 
cyclical factors. Hotchkiss and Rios- Avila (2013) found that nearly all of the decline from 2007–2012 
was cyclical. Bengali et al. (2013) also identified a substantial cyclical component in the decline from 
2007, as did a study by the Council of Economic Advisers, 2014a; Council of Economic Advisers, 
2014b. Aronson et al. (2014) looked at a variety of different approaches and concluded, in contrast, 
that much of the decline from 2007 was structural in nature.
The most commonly cited structural factor is the ageing of the population and the ‘baby- boom’ 
cohort. Abraham and Kearney (2018) detailed decomposition exercise distinguishing finely- grained 
age groups by gender found that changes in age composition and falling participation within age 
groups among young and prime- age adults have been equally important. The declining participation 
rate for younger age groups has been attributed in part to increased college attendance. Another 
Figure 4. Female labour force participation rate by age group Data source: OECD.
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hypothesis proposes that an increase in the value of leisure time owing to improved video gaming 
technology may have increased the relative attractiveness of non- work for young men (Aguiar et al., 
2017). Others suggests that changing social norms have made it more socially acceptable for young 
men to be out of work and relying on support from their parents (Eberstadt, 2016).
For prime- age and older workers, growth in the availability and/or generosity of social insur-
ance programs — including disability insurance, the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, 
and publicly provided or subsidized health insurance — have been advanced as contributing to 
declining participation. The dramatic growth in the prison population and discriminatory employ-
ment practices against those with criminal records may also mean more labour force drop- out after 
release (Western, 2018). The trend towards lower participation has coincided with the increase in 
premature mortality among non- Hispanic whites, highlighted by Case and Deaton (2017), Case and 
Deaton, 2017) as “deaths of despair”. The increase in opioid use in particular has received a great 
deal of attention; Krueger (2016) found, for example, that labour force participation fell more in 
areas where relatively more opioid pain medication has been prescribed, though causality likely runs 
in both directions.1
While much of the attention has focused on men, some of these drivers also apply to women, and 
other factors that may have contributed to the levelling- off in female labour force participation have 
also received attention. Blau and Kahn (2013) is among the studies highlighting the absence in the 
US of family- friendly policies such as paid parental leave. Caring for elderly parents may also be a 
factor, with the share of prime- age workers who have eldercare responsibilities increasing as the baby 
boom cohort ages. The importance of gender role attitudes has also been debated, with respect for 
example to the hypothesis that highly educated women have been increasingly ‘opting out’ (Goldin 
and Katz, 2008; Herr and Wolfram, 2009) or that there has been a ‘rebound in traditional gender 
role attitudes’ (Fortin, 2015).
With a great deal of attention paid in recent US research to the displacement of workers by a 
combination of globalization and technological change, including robotisation, some have argued 
that disappointing levels of participation reflect a growing mismatch between available workers and 
vacant jobs. The extent to which this is seen in the data, and if so whether it represents a short- term 
feature of the recession rather than a longer- term and more structural phenomenon, is contested. A 
related debate is about the extent to which declining rates of geographic mobility have led to lower 
rates of employment. Molloy et al. (2011), for example, document that internal migration rates have 
trended steadily downward over the past 25 years and are now lower than at any previous time in the 
post- war period.
For the UK, research has focused on the relatively limited job loss and unemployment increase 
during the Great Recession compared with previous downturns, and on the sharp recovery in the 
employment rate since 2012. This is generally linked to what happened to pay, with the UK seeing 
the biggest fall in real wages of any G7 country (Taylor et al., 2014), fairly uniform across sectors, 
so the focus of research has been as much on why wages have performed so poorly. The UK’s 
high degree of labour market ‘flexibility’ is often advanced as a key factor, but as Coulter (2016) 
points out, this does not help to explain why the Great Recession was so different from previous 
recessions since many of the key reforms aimed at increasing flexibility were enacted in the late 
1980s, and during the 1990s recession employment, rather than wages, bore the brunt of the 
shock. Research suggests that more people are willing to work at a given real wage and/or are less 
responsive to falls in the real wage (Disney et al., 2013), but it is not clear why this would be the 
case. An aspect that has received attention is capital ‘shallowing’ as opposed to deepening: the 
fall in the price of labour relative to the cost of capital may have encouraged firms to substitute 
labour for equipment. Pessoa and Van Reenen (2014) argue that this accounts for up to half of 
the fall in labour productivity since the start of the Great Recession, with a correspondingly large 
impact on employment.
1. Among the few such results available in the research literature, quasi- experimental evidence for Denmark 
shows that a 10 percentage point higher opioid prescription rate leads to a 1.5 percentage point decrease in 
labour force participation for an average individual (Laird and Nielsen, 2016).
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A sharp increase in labour market polarisation was also seen in the UK during the recession, with 
low- skilled jobs expanding their share and medium- skilled jobs continuing to decline (Plunkett and 
Pessoa, 2013), and sectoral shifts may also have been important in the evolution of average real 
wages with some higher paying sectors experiencing falls in employment and a marked shift from 
public to private sector employment. Inward migration may have been associated with greater will-
ingness to work in insecure sectors and for lower pay, though empirical studies have not found a 
statistically significant impact from EU migration on native employment outcomes (Devlin, 2014). 
Changes in social transfers from 2010, reducing their generosity and increasing conditionality in terms 
of job search, might have reduced the reservation wage for some. Enhanced family policy may also 
have played a role in boosting female participation.
4. Method and data
We now set out our approach to understanding the evolution of labour force participation over time 
in the US and the UK, and how this relates to previous US studies. A useful point of departure is the 
Aaronson et al. (2006) study employing a cohort- based model.2 In this modelling strategy, partici-
pation rates are analysed separately by age group and gender. Controls include only aggregate vari-
ables, where aggregation is specific to the different gender and age groups. The controls include the 
share of individuals with high/low education, the share of individuals living in different types of house-
holds (eg, with/without a partner, with/without children), the share of individuals with disabilities, 
measures of earning potentials such as the (age- specific) gender wage gap, measures of (average) 
household wealth, measures for business cycle effects, and proxies for the relevant social programs, 
such as the availability of childcare for women in childbearing years, and the fraction of individuals 
eligible for early retirement in older cohorts. Because each gender- age subgroup provides one unit of 
observation, the identification of the effects of each determinant can be obtained only by exploiting 
its variation over time. Time invariant cohort effects are also included. Aggregation over the different 
gender- age categories is obtained by weighting the participation rates in each subgroup by the popu-
lation size of that subgroup.
However, the group- level analysis suffers from what is known as the “ecological fallacy” (see 
Appendix A). Using micro- data helps to avoid this problem, and it also allows to control for more 
characteristics.3 This is the strategy used, for instance, by Aronson et al. (2012), who estimate the 
probability of being in the labour force at the individual level, separately by gender and age groups, 
in order to allow the cohort effects and other controls to flexibly vary across age, gender, and educa-
tion. They control for age, year of birth, race, education, the business cycle, plus include additional 
conditioning variables for specific demographic groups, like the real state minimum wage and the 
ratio of the average youth hourly wage to average adult hourly wage for the younger age groups, 
indicators for being married with children and married with a young child for the middle age groups, 
and gender- specific life expectancies for the older age groups.
We follow this approach here and model participation at the individual level, by considering three 
groups of variables: (i) individual and household characteristics X, (ii) regional labour market charac-
teristics L, and (iii) regional policies P. Participation is therefore modelled as
 pi,t = f(Xi,t, Lr,t,Pr,t). 1
To obtain a more flexible specification, equation (1) is estimated separately by gender.
One major challenge for this comparative exercise is obtaining consistent and homogeneous data, 
meaning that variables have the same meaning irrespective of time and space.4 We use the Labour 
Force Survey (LFS) for the UK and the Current Population Survey (CPS) for the US. For each year, we 
select the second quarter LFS for the UK and the March CPS for the US, because these particular 
surveys contain additional information. Our data are repeated cross- sections.
2. The same methodology is used, among others, by the European Commission in its 2015 Ageing Report – see 
European Commission (2014), European Commission, 2015).
3. One could use micro- data and then aggregate them and run a cohort- based analysis – this is, for instance, 
what Aaronson et al. (2006) do. However, the advantages of using an aggregate model then become even less 
evident.
4. This does not prevent us from including country- specific covariates in some of the models, when appropriate.
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Most of the data constraints are in the UK data, as the Office for National Statistics does not 
attempt to homogenize variables in the face of significant changes in the questionnaire over the years. 
We select only variables that can be traced back with a sufficient level of reliability (allowing minor 
changes in the filtering conditions or categorical values). There is a tradeoff between the number of 
variables that can be included and the length of the time series. We focus on the period between 
1996 and 2017, as information on educational levels, health status, home ownership, and household 
composition prior to 1996 becomes difficult to compare with more recent waves. As conservative as 
this choice can appear, it still precludes the use of retrospective information, in particular the labour 
market status of individuals in previous periods, which is only available from 2011 onwards. However, 
while participation in the past is possibly the single most important predictor of current participation, 
its inclusion would in any case have been problematic. This is because, without controlling for indi-
vidual effects (which is possible only using panel data), the lagged endogenous variable will soak up 
the effects of unobserved heterogeneity, hence introducing an upward bias in true state persistence. 
Finally, in the LFS it is not possible to reconstruct the labour market status of partners.
While these data limitations with respect to the UK constrain our choices of covariates for the US, 
we end up with datasets for the two countries that are highly comparable. The differences are:
•	 Health: We define “bad health” in the UK data as having a health problem that limits the kind 
of paid work that the respondent can do, while in the US data we define it as being in the lower 
two categories of five- category self- reported health status. The resulting fraction of individuals 
with “bad” health is larger in the UK than in the US, as shown in the descriptive statistics (see 
Table 1).
•	 Race: A dummy for Hispanic is added for the US.
•	 Household type: The US data allow distinguishing married couples living together from married 
individuals living with a partner outside marriage. We follow the UK definition and distinguish 
only between married individuals living alone and married individuals living with their partner, 
irrespective of whether the partner is their spouse or not.
•	 Children: The UK data provide dummies for the presence of children of different ages (under 
2, 2–4, 5–9, 10–15) in the household. They do not provide information on the number of chil-
dren in each age group. The US data records the overall number of children and the age of the 
youngest and the oldest child. From this we reconstructed dummies for the youngest children 
being in each relevant age group (under 2, 2–4, 5–9, 10–15). Consequently, it is possible that all 
flags related to children are switched on in the UK data while in the US data they are mutually 
exclusive.
•	 Home ownership: In the UK data it is possible to distinguish between whether the house is 
owned outright or with an ongoing mortgage. Information on mortgages is available only from 
2010 onwards in the US data and is therefore not included.
Data for social policies come from the OECD Social Policy database. They include the amount 
of social expenditures for family policies and the amount of total social expenditures, both as a 
percentage of GDP.
Data for family policies are taken from the OECD Family database. The variables selected are 
Maternity total protected weeks, defined as the maximum weeks of job- protected maternity, parental 
and home care leave available to mothers, regardless of income support, maternity total paid weeks, 
the total weeks of paid maternity, parental and home care payments available to mothers, paternity 
total specific weeks, the total weeks of leave reserved for exclusive use by the father, and paternity 
specific paid weeks, the total weeks of paid leave reserved for exclusive use by the father. Data are 
restricted to 2016 for the US.
In the analysis of the US, we use additional state- level policy information provided by the University 
of Kentucky Center for Poverty Research (UKCPR).5 In particular, we consider the following variables: 
AFCD/TANF/SNAP, the combined monthly maximum AFDC/TANF and Food Stamps benefits for a 
4- person family; EITC2max, the EITC maximum credit for two dependents; EITC state, the state EITC 
credit as percentage of the federal credit; and SSI federal, the monthly maximum federal SSI benefits 
for individuals living independently.6
5. See www.ukcpr.org/data.
6. We include AFDC/TANF/Food Stamp monthly maximum for a 4- person family only as this is highly correlated 
with the monthly maxima for other types of family. Similarly for the EITC maximum credit.
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Table 1. Average values
US UK
1996 2017 1996 2017
Active 0.775 0.743 0.778 0.798
Student 0.106 0.150 0.070 0.088
NEET (15-24) (a) 0.232 0.220 0.241 0.175
Age 37.0 38.5 38.1 40.1
Year of birth 1959.0 1978.5 1957.9 1976.9
Race black 0.099 0.123 0.015 0.030
Race other 0.049 0.108 0.040 0.103
Hispanic 0.152 0.204
Foreign born 0.150 0.192 0.078 0.177
Foreign national 0.094 0.102 0.047 0.142
Education low 0.202 0.156 0.359 0.164
Education medium 0.581 0.545 0.442 0.447
Education high 0.218 0.299 0.199 0.388
Household single alone 0.272 0.312 0.260 0.283
Household single cohabiting 0.020 0.043 0.054 0.121
Household married alone 0.009 0.013 0.016 0.003
Household married cohabiting 0.565 0.510 0.557 0.487
Household separated alone 0.025 0.019 0.024 0.023
Household separated cohabiting 0.002 0.003 0.004 0.003
Household divorced alone 0.082 0.070 0.052 0.048
Household divorced cohabiting 0.012 0.018 0.019 0.023
Household widowed alone 0.012 0.011 0.013 0.009
Household widowed cohabiting 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001
Number of children 0.953 0.950
Household child under 2 (b) 0.080 0.065 0.078 0.074
Household child 2–4 (c) 0.090 0.084 0.114 0.116
Household child 5–9 (d) 0.105 0.104 0.173 0.182
Household child 10–15 (e) 0.105 0.111 0.210 0.206
Health bad 0.092 0.097 0.152 0.139
Home owned 0.664 0.645 0.729 0.646
Home owned outright 0.154 0.199
Home owned mortgage 0.576 0.447
Rural 0.220 0.172
Unemployment rate (regional or state level) 0.061 0.048 0.084 0.045
GDP per capita (national currency) 29,615 58,081 (2016) 15,526 30,850
Minimum wage (% of GDP per capita) (f) 0.154 0.147 (2016) 0.000 0.233
Social expenditure family (% of GDP) (g) 0.5 0.7 (2016) 2.2 3.8
Social expenditure total (% of GDP) (h) 14.8 19.3 (2016) 18.1 21.5
Maternity total protected (weeks) (i) 12 12 (2016) 40 70
Maternity total paid (weeks) (j) 0 0 (2016) 18 39
Paternity total specific (weeks) (k) 12 12 (2016) 0 20
Continued
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The minimum wage is at the national level for the UK. For the US, we use the state minimum wage, 
as provided by the UKCPR.
We normalise monetary variables, including the minimum wage, by the GDP per capita (in thou-
sands of dollars/pounds). As monetary variables (benefits and the minimum wage) have state variation 
in the US, we use state- level GDP per capita for the US. As the only monetary variable for the UK is 
the minimum wage, which has only national variation, we use national GDP per capita for the UK. This 
normalisation eliminates the need to convert currencies and to adjust for inflation. Moreover, GDP and 
GDP per capita are potentially endogenous to the participation rate, with reverse causality running 
from participation to income and income per capita. If this is the case, the minimum wage and the 
social benefits, which are obviously influenced by the level of income (both real and nominal), are 
also endogenous. Our normalisation should help net this out and leave only a measure of the relative 
generosity of the policy. To be more concrete, let the policies P be a function of GDP per capita, y:
 Pr,t = g(yr,t) 2
where GDP per capita is potentially a function of participation:
 yr,t = h(pr,t) 3
Normalising the policy indicators by the level of GDP per capita breaks the endogeneity problem 
if the function g is approximately linear:
 
Pr,t
yr,t
= αyr,tyr,t = α 4
However, some policies — in particular the minimum wage — may be affected by the participation 
rate not only indirectly, via the level of income, but also directly, as in:
 Pr,t = g(yr,t, pr,t) 2’
This could happen if politicians see the minimum wage as a way to influence participation. Our 
normalisation is not safe against this possibility. This suggests caution is needed in interpreting the 
coefficient for the (normalised) minimum wage.
US UK
1996 2017 1996 2017
Paternity total specific paid (weeks) (l) 0 0 (2016) 0 2
AFDC/TANF/SNAP(m) 29.3 21.2 (2016)
SSI federal (n) 16.4 13.4 (2016)
EITC2max (o) 124.0 102.0 (2016)
EITC state (p) 0.027 0.160 (2016)
a. Not in employment, education or training.
b. UK: presence of children below 2. US: youngest child below 2.
c. UK: presence of children aged between 2 and 4. US: youngest child aged between 2 and 4.
d UK: presence of children aged between 5 and 9. US: youngest child aged between 5 and 9.
e. UK: presence of children aged between 10 and 15. US: youngest child aged between 10 and 15.
f. UK: national minimum wage. US: state minimum wage. Normalised by GDP per capita (000).
g. Social expenditures on family policies (% of GDP).
h. Social expenditures, total (% of GDP).
i. Maximum weeks of job- protected maternity, parental and home care leave available to mothers, regardless of income support.
j. Total weeks of paid maternity, parental and home care payments available to mothers.
k. Total weeks of leave reserved for exclusive use by the father.
l. Total weeks of paid leave reserved for exclusive use by the father.
m. Combined monthly maximum AFDC/TANF and Food Stamps benefits for a 4- person family. Normalised by GDP per capita and 
multiplied by 1,000.
n. EITC maximum credit for two dependents. Normalised by GDP per capita (000).
o. Monthly maximum federal SSI benefits for individuals living independently. Normalised by GDP per capita (000).
p. State EITC rate as percentage of Federal credit.
Table 1. Continued
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We end up with 1,550,258 observations for the UK and 2,528,122 observations for the US. Minimum 
legal working age is 16 in the UK and 14 in the US, with limits on the number of hours worked by 
minors under the age of 16. Hence, we focus on the 16- and- over population. As labour market status 
is not recorded in the UK data for individuals above state pension age unless they are working, and 
state pension age has changed over the years, we restrict our analysis to females under 60 and males 
under 65.
Average values for the variables we include in the analysis, in the initial and final year, are reported 
in Table 1.
Data sources: UK LFS Q2; March CPS; OECD Family and Social Policy databases; University of 
Kentucky Center for Poverty Research, UKCPR National Welfare Data 1980–2016.
In the analysis, we focus on the non- student population. The trends in labour force participation 
shown above in Figures 3 and 4 remain substantially unchanged when students are excluded.
With these data, we estimate logistic regression models that include the following variables:
•	 Demography: age (squared polynomial), cohort (squared polynomial),7 race (white, black or 
other), ethnicity (US only: Hispanic or other), country of birth (foreign or domestic), citizenship 
(foreign or domestic).
•	 Education: low, middle or high.
•	 Household type: marital status (single, married, separated, divorced or widowed), interacted 
with cohabitation (presence of a partner).
•	 Children: age of children (US only: number of children).
•	 Health: self- reported bad health status.
•	 Home ownership: rent or ownership (UK only: presence of a mortgage).
•	 Geography: 20 regions for the UK, 56 FIPS codes for the US, plus an urban/rural indicator for 
the US.
•	 Business cycle: regional unemployment rate, post- crisis (2009 onwards) dummy.
•	 Policies: minimum wage, characteristics of family policies (number of weeks of maximum and 
parental leave and number of weeks of paid parental leave, for both men and women), amount 
of social expenditures in % of GDP, additional indicators for the generosity of the AFDC/TANF/
Food Stamp/EITC/SSI programs for the US.
•	 Time interactions: year interacted with health status and education. This allows the effects of 
health and education to vary over time, with a linear trend.
Since there is no longitudinal variation in the family policy measures at the federal level in the US, 
these are excluded for the US. To measure the business cycle, we prefer the unemployment rate over 
other measures like the gap between GDP and potential GDP (as employed by Aronson et al., 2012), 
as the unemployment rate has regional variation.
In the main analysis, age, period, and cohort effects are disentangled by means of parametric 
assumptions. Specifically, age and cohort are assumed to enter with a quadratic specification, while 
period effects are proxied by the business cycle.
5. Analyses
The results are reported in Table 2. The model is estimated separately by gender and country (for non- 
students only). The baseline is a white individual with middle education, single (and not cohabiting), 
renting (rather than owning), who lives in London (UK) or urban California (US).
Figure 5a–d show the actual versus estimated participation rates. Apart from the age group 16–19, 
where the population of non- students is very small, the goodness of fit is high.
Most of the estimated effects in Table 2 go in the expected direction. In both countries, being 
black reduces ceteris paribus participation for males and increases it for females. Male immigrants 
(born outside the country) are more likely to be in the labour force in both countries, all else equal, 
whereas for women that effect is insignificant in the US and negative in the UK. Hispanics partic-
ipate more in the US, whether male or female. Living with a partner outside marriage increases 
participation for both genders, compared to living alone, while marriage increases participation 
for males and decreases it for females. Being separated or divorced increases participation for 
both genders. Widowhood increases participation for males and decreases it for females. Home 
7. Cohort is measured in years from 1900, to reduce the collinearity between cohort and cohort squared.
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Table 2. Logit estimates of the probability of being in the labour force
(1) (2) (3) (4)
US UK US UK
Male Male Female Female
Variables 16–64 16–64 16–59 16–59
Age 0.123 *** 0.178 *** 0.076 *** 0.156 ***
Age squared –0.002 *** –0.003 *** –0.001 *** –0.002 ***
Year of birth 0.029 *** 0.047 *** 0.034 *** 0.056 ***
Year of birth squared 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 ***
Race black –0.479 *** –0.315 *** 0.174 *** 0.231 ***
Race other –0.367 *** –0.447 *** –0.109 *** –0.712 ***
Foreign born 0.311 *** 0.222 *** 0.003 –0.063 ***
Foreign national 0.112 *** –0.082 *** –0.519 *** –0.043 ***
Hispanic 0.111 *** 0.105 ***
Education high –31.25 *** –4.44 –24.42 *** 10.35 ***
Education low 3.050 5.772 * –13.140 *** 25.070 ***
Health bad –8.532 ** –47.640 *** 29.210 *** 0.993
Year x health 0.003 * 0.023 *** –0.015 *** –0.001
Year x education high 0.016 *** 0.002 0.012 *** –0.005 ***
Year x education low –0.002 –0.003 * 0.006 *** –0.013 ***
Household single cohab 0.735 *** 0.617 *** 0.191 *** 0.212 ***
Household married alone 0.639 *** 0.804 *** –0.050 * –0.167 ***
Household married cohab 0.899 *** 0.730 *** –0.384 *** –0.141 ***
Household separated alone 0.443 *** 0.361 *** 0.200 *** 0.037 *
Household separated cohab 0.548 *** 1.030 *** 0.063 0.399 ***
Household divorced alone 0.486 *** 0.307 *** 0.315 *** 0.206 ***
Household divorced cohab 0.793 *** 0.689 *** 0.197 *** 0.300 ***
Household widowed alone 0.133 *** 0.238 *** –0.431 *** –0.084 ***
Household widowed cohab 0.351 *** 0.544 *** –0.248 *** 0.059
Household child under 2 0.041 –0.114 *** –0.967 *** –1.479 ***
Household child 2–4 0.013 –0.205 *** –0.645 *** –1.283 ***
Household child 5–9 0.067 *** –0.225 *** –0.285 *** –0.759 ***
Household child 10–15 0.169 *** –0.145 *** 0.071 *** –0.429 ***
Number of children 0.139 *** –0.094 ***
Home owned 0.068 *** 0.182 ***
Unemployment rate –1.215 *** –0.023 0.615 ** –0.038
Post- crisis 0.116 *** 0.089 ** 0.083 *** 0.043
Minimum wage –0.546 –0.243 * 0.910 *** –0.010
Social expenditure family –0.104 ** –0.031 0.091 ** 0.005
Social expenditure total –0.008 –0.010 –0.021 ** –0.008
AFDC/TANF/SNAP –0.014 *** –0.018 ***
SSI federal 0.003 0.022
EITC2max 0.000 0.000
Continued
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ownership is associated with increased participation, and in the UK (whether outright owners versus 
those with mortgages can be distinguished) this is most pronounced in presence of a mortgage; 
it should be noted, though, that causality could well go in the other direction, from participation 
to home ownership.8 Having older children in the household increases participation for males in 
the US but decreases it in the UK; female participation is generally reduced by children in both 
countries.
Business cycle conditions seem to matter only in the US, decreasing participation for males and 
increasing it for females. The positive post- Great Recession dummy variable we find in the US case 
goes against the narrative of a negative structural break taking place around that time in the US; any 
such effect is more muted in the UK, though still positive for men.
The minimum wage, normalised by GDP per capita, has a positive effect for females in the US; 
in all other cases it is either not significant or only weakly so. Expenditure on family policies at the 
national level has a negative impact on participation for males and a positive impact for females, but 
only in the US. Higher AFDC/TANF benefits and Food Stamps are associated with lower participation 
for both males and females in the US. Greater maternity leave is associated with slightly lower female 
participation in the UK, while the opposite is the case for paternity leave. (Such a relationship cannot 
be probed for the US as there is no variation in the duration of leave periods across the sample).
Overall, the multivariate analysis confirms the divergence in labour force participation patterns 
between the US and the UK observed in the raw data. And it offers a number of clues about the 
sources of this divergence. Three are of particular importance.
First, contrary to the popular narrative that sees a specific participation problem for US males, the 
US- UK divergence is particularly marked for the female population.
Second, education appears to have been an important part of the story. Table 3 brings out that, 
after taking into account the interaction with time, high education has a positive effect on participa-
tion, although for men in the UK the effect is very limited, and low education has a negative effect 
throughout. The positive effects of high education are increasing over time in the US, both for males 
and females, while they are much more constant in the UK. The negative effects of low education do 
8. This could also be a concern for other variables, if less clear- cut. For instance, not participating in the labour 
market could affect self- perceived health status, while participation could sometimes be a positive for the likeli-
hood of marriage.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
US UK US UK
Male Male Female Female
EITC state –0.022 0.019
Rural –0.137 *** 0.007
Home owned outright 0.240 *** 0.320 ***
Home owned mortgage 1.232 *** 1.056 ***
Maternity total protected –0.007 *** –0.008 ***
Maternity total paid 0.006 *** 0.000
Paternity total specific 0.007 * 0.007 ***
Constant 1.127 *** –0.792 0.461 ** –3.431 ***
Observations 1,063,351 718,417 1053301 704,235
chi2 97,216 120,525 79,867 120,176
P 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
r2_p 0.239 0.364 0.118 0.246
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Students excluded. The baseline is a medium education white individual, single and not cohabiting, living in urban California (US) or 
central London (UK), and renting. Cohort is measured subtracting 1,900 from year of birth. State (US) and NUTS1 (UK) regional dummies 
included.
Table 2. Continued
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not vary much over time in either country, for men. For women, they are decreasing over time in the 
US, and increasing in the UK.
It is particularly noteworthy that in the US the impact on labour force participation of low education 
hasn't changed over time for men, and has become less unfavourable for women. This is contrary to 
the popular story that changes in the labour market have made it much more difficult or less attractive 
for Americans with limited education to participate.
Over the period covered by our analysis, 1996–2017,, the proportion of the working- aged popula-
tion with low education fell much more rapidly in the UK than in the US. The decline in the UK was 20 
percentage points, versus just four percentage points in the US (Table 1). This difference in compo-
sitional shift is likely to have had a large effect on the differing labour force participation trends in 
the two countries. Similarly, the share with high education increased by 18 percentage points in the 
UK, compared to eight percentage points in the US (Table 1). Although the effects of high education 
Figure 5. Observed vs. fitted participation rates, (a) US males, (b) UK males, (c) US females, (d) UK females. 
Coefficients as in Table 2.
Table 3. Effects of education and health over time
Males Females
US UK US UK
Case Reference category 1996 2017 1996 2017 1996 2017 1996 2017
Education High Education Medium 0.29 0.62 0.04 0.08 0.33 0.59 0.57 0.47
Education Low Education Medium –0.58 –0.62 –0.40 –0.46 –0.80 –0.67 –0.48 –0.75
Health Bad Health Good –2.16 –2.10 –2.73 –2.26 –1.33 –1.65 –1.90 –1.93
Notes: The table reports the contribution to the logit score from Table 2. The non- linearity of the logit function 
means that the same increase in the logit score has a different impact on the estimated probability depending on 
the starting value of the score.
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increased over time in the US but not in the UK, the compositional shift is likely to have overwhelmed 
this and thus contributed to the better labour force participation trend in the UK.
A third key finding is that health appears to have mattered less than some have hypothesized. In 
Table 3 we see that bad (self- reported) health has a negative effect on participation. The negative 
effects of bad health remain more or less constant over time for US males and UK females, whereas 
they get smaller (less negative) for UK males and larger (more negative) for US females. So in the US 
case, where the relationship between health and participation for men has been such a focus in recent 
debate, there is no evidence that those in bad health have become less likely to participate over time; 
it is only for women that any such pattern is seen. The proportion reporting their health to be 'bad' 
rose only marginally in the US (Table 1). This lack of a significant rise, coupled with the fact that the 
impact of health didn't change for individuals, casts doubt on the much- discussed role of increasing 
levels of ill- health and the opioid crisis in reducing labour force participation in the United States.
Figure 6. Estimated age effects: Participation probability at average values of other variables.
Figure 7. Estimated cohort effects: Participation probability at average values of other variables.
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How much have cyclical forces mattered? Our strategy for distinguishing the role of cyclical factors 
relative to structural factors in accounting for the differing over- time patterns in the US and the UK is 
to examine age, period, and cohort effects. Age and cohort effects, as well as the effects of the other 
characteristics analysed above, are considered ‘structural’. The so- called 'period' effect, which we 
measure through macroeconomic variables, captures the cyclical component.
Starting from the age and cohort effect, Figures 6 and 7 display the estimated participation prob-
abilities for different ages and cohorts respectively, at the average values of all other covariates.9
Female participation increases much more steeply at younger ages in the UK than in the US, while 
for both genders participation starts decreasing later in life. Male participation rates for later cohorts, 
after controlling for other characteristics, are basically flat in the UK, but are trending downwards in in 
the US. The difference is even more prominent for women, where the cohort effects are positive for 
the UK, and negative for the US. The ageing of the baby boom generation is thus having a greater 
impact in the US than the UK for two reasons: the decline in participation rates with age is more 
marked in the US, and the baby boom generation is a relatively high- participation generation in the 
US compared with younger generations, a good deal more so than in the UK, so its gradual exit from 
the working age population is more detrimental to overall labour force participation there. While 
ageing is more pronounced in the UK than in the US, the negative impact on participation is more 
pronounced in the US.
As already noted, the truly ‘cyclical’ component is captured, in our model, by macroeconomic vari-
ables: the unemployment rate and a post-2008 dummy. In particular, the positive or non- significant 
coefficient associated to the post-2008 period shows that the cyclical component was not worse 
during the Great Recession than in other recessions. If anything, the Great Recession had a milder 
effect (for each percentage point increase in the unemployment rate) than other recessions.
Robustness checks on our specification for the APC analysis are performed in Appendix B.
Given the centrality of structural factors, we are particularly interested in understanding the relative 
importance of differences in the composition of the population (endowments) versus differences in 
behaviour (as reflected in the estimated coefficients in our models) in explaining the different trajec-
tories of participation in the US and the UK. For example, are these driven by changes in the age 
or education profile of the working- age population, or by changes in the likelihood that someone 
of a given age and education will be participating? We explore this by means of an Oaxaca- Blinder 
decomposition exercise for logit models, the standard approach employed in such contexts. The 
details of this analysis are in Appendix C. The Oaxaca- Blinder decomposition focuses on whether that 
part of the structural component attributable to specific covariates reflects composition effects or 
behavioural effects.
The answer is both, with approximately equal impact. Dividing our sample into two sub- periods, 
1996–2007 and 2008–2017, we decomposed the average difference in participation between the 
two countries into the difference attributable to ‘endowments/characteristics’ of the working- age 
population versus ‘behaviour’ as reflected in the estimated coefficients on these characteristics in our 
econometric models. For men, there was a negligible average participation gap between the two 
countries in the first period, whereas by the second period a substantial gap had emerged. In the first 
period, the “endowments” of the working- age population were more positive for participation in the 
US, but this was almost exactly offset by negative behavioural effects. By 2008–2017, the positive 
effect of endowments for the US in reducing the participation gap had effectively disappeared, while 
the negative effect of coefficients had also increased substantially. In the earlier period US women 
had an even greater advantage over their UK counterparts than men in terms of employment- related 
characteristics; by the latter period this had fallen by three- quarters, and the effect of coefficients/
behaviours in widening the participation gap were also greater. For both men and women, the overall 
deterioration in US participation rates vis-à-vis the UK is quite evenly split between changes in endow-
ments and in coefficients.
9. These age and cohort profiles should not be interpreted as average participation rates; they are highly hypo-
thetical counterfactuals. For instance, they assume that individuals have at the same time high, medium and low 
education, in proportion to the share of individuals with high, medium and low education observed in the data. 
All mutually exclusive categorical variables, which in the data are expressed with a 0–1 dummy variable, have 
intermediate values in this exercise — not only education, but also marital status, health status, etc. Moreover, 
all characteristics are kept constant across ages and cohorts. This means for example that we assume the same 
(“mixed”) marital status irrespective of age, or cohort.
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Behaviour was less favourable to participa-
tion in the US in the first period, but this disad-
vantage has increased in the second period. For 
men this is particularly related to the labour force 
participation of married men, who had been 
more likely to participate in the US than the UK 
but this is no longer the case. For women the 
overall behavioural effect reflects relatively small 
changes for most of the variables, together with 
an increased effect of general trends related to 
age, cohort, and residual effects.
The composition of the population was previ-
ously more favourable to participation in the US 
than in the UK, but that advantage has been 
lost, primarily due the rapid increase in educa-
tional attainment in the UK. The share of men 
with low education in the US went down only 
four percentage points, from 21% in 1996 to 
17%, while in the UK it went down 14 percentage 
points, from 32% to 18%. The difference is even 
more striking for women: in the US, the share of 
women with low education also went down four 
percentage points, from 19% in 1996 to 15% in 
2017, while in the UK it went down a spectacular 
25 percentage points, from 40% to 15%. High 
education also plays a role. The share of men 
with high education went up only five percentage 
points in the US, from 23% in 1996 to 28% in 2017, 
while in the UK it went up 16 percentage points, 
from 21% to 37%. For women, the difference is 
again more pronounced. The share of women with high education in the US went up 11 percentage 
points, from 21% in 1996 to 32% in 2017, while in the UK it went up 22 percentage points, from 19% 
to 41%.
6. The US-UK contrast in broader comparative context
The turnaround in US labour force participation, from rapid increase in the 1980s and 1990s to decline 
in both absolute and relative (to other nations) terms since 2000, is a puzzling development. We 
have attempted to understand the American experience via an in- depth comparison with the United 
Kingdom, a country that is similar in labour market regulation and monetary governance and that 
experienced comparable employment performance up to 2000.
Our analysis suggests three core conclusions. First, the weakening of US labour force participation 
is not mainly a story of (white) males. The decline in participation has been even more significant 
among American women, and for women, unlike for men, this decline is a change from the pattern 
that obtained in the 1980s and 1990s. Figure 9a and b show that this conclusion isn't peculiar to our 
US- UK comparison. We also observe it when we consider all of the rich longstanding democratic 
nations. Figure 8 shows labour force participation rates among prime- working- age (25–54) men, and 
Figure  8b does so for prime- age women. Among men, the labour force participation rate in the 
United States has fallen more rapidly than in most other nations, but the US already had one of the 
lowest rates by 2000. Among women, by contrast, the US in 2000 ranked tenth out of the twenty- one 
countries in prime- age labour force participation. By 2017, the US ranking had fallen to eighteenth.
Our second key conclusion is that structural forces have played a more important role in the 
falling US labour force participation rate than cyclical factors. Especially noteworthy is that we find 
the 2008–09 Great Recession and its aftermath to have been no more influential than prior reces-
sions in driving lower participation rates in the United States. This too is evident in Figure 9a and 
Figure 8. (a) Labour force participation rate, age 25–54, 
men, (b) Labour force participation rate, age 25–54, 
women The line for the United States is in bold. Data 
source: OECD.
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b. The decline in prime- working- age male labour 
force participation has been a steady pattern over 
a number of decades, and the decline in female 
participation has been a steady pattern since the 
turn of the century.
Our third conclusion is that the influence of 
structural forces is a product of both changes in 
composition and changes in behaviours. Among 
these changes, we found a particularly influential 
one in the US- UK contrast to be the much slower 
increase in educational attainment in the United 
States.
Here too we can spot this in a broader compar-
ison, as we see in Figure  9a and b. Figure  9a 
shows the share of 25- to-64- year- olds that have 
completed less than upper secondary educa-
tion. The share of Americans with low education 
is among the lowest in this group of nations, but 
that has been true for decades, and during this 
period other countries have been catching up, 
with their low- educated share falling at a faster 
rate. In other words, not only the UK but virtu-
ally every other rich democratic nations has been 
making more rapid progress than the United 
States in increasing educational attainment at the 
low end.
The same is true at the high end, as we see 
in Figure  9b. This chart shows the share of 
25- to-34- year- olds with a bachelor's degree or 
more. These data are only available since 2000, 
but here too we see the United States starting in a leading position but other nations catching up 
quickly, and here even surpassing the US by the 2010s.
In the 1990s and 2000s, the United States was widely viewed as an affluent democratic country 
that had comparatively high poverty and inequality but was successful in achieving high employment 
(OECD, 1994; Scharpf and Schmidt, 2000; Kenworthy, 2008). This success was commonly attributed 
to its comparatively deregulated labour markets, low wages, and limited taxes and government bene-
fits. America's disappointing employment performance since the turn of the century suggests this 
view was either wrong or specific to a particular historical period.
If an embrace of "low- road capitalism" no longer yields good employment outcomes for the 
United States, what will? Our findings suggest that a focus on males or on cyclical patterns is likely 
to be of limited help. Longer- term structural developments affecting both men and even more so 
women are at the core of the problem. It may well be, as an emerging view suggests, that an expan-
sion of family- friendly programs such as early education and paid parental leave would be of consid-
erable help. But our analyses suggest the US might also do well to turn its attention to educational 
attainment.
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Appendix A
Avoiding the Ecological Fallacy
Group- level analysis can suffer from the “ecological fallacy” ((Robinson, 1950)), which arises 
when aggregate data are used to make inferences about individual level parameters. Many 
investigators have shown that the aggregate and the individual- level coefficients seldom 
agree in either magnitude or direction.
For instance, it is possible that the individual probability to participate is higher for the 
majority of individuals in group A, but group B displays a higher aggregate participation 
rate. Suppose there are 1,000 individuals in each group. 800 individuals in group A have a 
probability to participate of 50%, while the remaining 200 individuals have a probability to 
participate of 0. In group B, 800 individuals have a probability of 40%, and 200 individuals 
have a probability of 100%. Individuals in group A are more likely to participate than 
individuals in group B; however, the participation rate is higher in group B (52% versus 40%).
Also, a characteristic might negatively affect the participation rate at the individual 
level but display a positive association at the aggregate level. As an example, individual 
wealth might have a negative impact on participation, but aggregate wealth could affect 
participation even after controlling for individual wealth. This could happen for instance 
if people are trying to “catch up with the Joneses”, reacting to relative wealth. If the 
distribution of wealth is skewed enough, a positive association between wealth and the 
participation rate would be detected, at the aggregate level.
Avoiding the ecological fallacy is important if one wants to identify the channels through 
which the determinants of participation work. This is particularly important when it comes to 
evaluating or devising policies aimed at fostering participation. In the example of footnote 4, 
where both individual and relative wealth matter for particiation, a policy aimed at reducing 
property taxes for low- value houses on the basis of a positive association between wealth 
and participation detected at the aggregate level, would achieve the opposite effect of 
lowering participation rates, both because it increases individual wealth and because it 
reduces wealth differentials.
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Appendix B
Alternative specifications for the Age, Period, and 
Cohort Effects
One of the principal challenges in interpreting what underlies the observed patterns of 
labour force participation is distinguishing the effects of age, period and cohort. Labour 
force participation varies with age, generally rising to middle age and then declining; it may 
differ from one age group or cohort to another, so that for example at a given age more 
of those born in 1955 than 1935 are in the labour force; and participation may be higher in 
one time- period than another, for various reasons including the state of the economy and 
structural factors. This is an analytical problem that arises in a very wide range of contexts, 
with which social science has struggled. As is well known, age, period and cohort effects are 
not separately identifiable, given that
 period = cohort + age 6
In our analysis we have followed a parametric strategy according to which age and cohort 
enter the specification with a second order polynomial, while period effects are entirely 
captured by macroeconomic variables (the regional unemployment rate and a shifter for 
before/after the financial crisis). In this way, we can identify both the linear and the quadratic 
effect of age and cohort, up to a constant. Moreover, this lean specification allows us to 
identify the effects of policies on top of the business cycle, though these also include 
additional unknown period effects which are not captured by our macroeconomic variables.
To assess this specification choice, we can compare it with a fully saturated model, where 
dummies are introduced for each region- period interaction. This allows the period effects 
to differ across regions in a flexible way, but it comes at two costs: (i) the first order (linear) 
effects of cohort and age are no longer identifiable, and (ii) the effects of policies are also 
no longer identifiable. Moreover, the degrees of freedom of the model increase enormously 
(with 50 states in the US and 22 periods, we introduce 1,100 extra variables). Ultimately, 
the choice is between measuring imprecisely the effects of policies in our baseline model, 
by being unable to disentangle the residual period effects, and measuring imprecisely the 
period effects in the saturated model, by being unable to disentangle the effects of policies. 
An intermediate option is to assume that period effects are homogenous across regions, and 
introduce (non- interacted) time dummies in the model. This allows one to identify the effects 
of policy differentials when policies have regional variation (ie, in the US only) with respect to 
some benchmark - either the national average, or some specific region. However, the linear 
age and cohort effects are still not identifiable, and only the curvature of the age and cohort 
profiles, which is an object of lesser interest, can be analysed.
We label our baseline model ‘m1’. The intermediate option is ‘m2’, while the fully 
saturated model is ‘m3’.
As (i) we are mostly interested in the first order effects of age and cohort, (ii) we have 
a large number of controls at the individual and regional level that could in principle 
explain part of the period effects, and (iii) we want to be able to say something about the 
effects of policies, we tend to prefer our lean specification. However, to assess how much 
explanatory power we lose by adopting it, we also run the other models, plus a benchmark 
model labelled ‘m0’ where we do not control for any period effect –that is we exclude all 
the covariates with only national or regional time variation (the macroeconomic and policy 
variables). Table B1 summarises the alternative models tested. It highlights the benefits 
of our lean specification m1; as already noted, this is the only model amongst those 
considered where the linear age and cohort effects and the policy effects are separately 
identifiable.
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Table B1. Alternative specifications
Model name Treatment of period effect
Linear age and cohort 
effects identifiable Policy effects identifiable
m0 No period effects Yes No
m1
Period effects captured by 
macroeconomic variables Yes Yes
m2 Time dummies No
only policy differentials in the 
US
m3 Time*region dummies No No
The four models are nested. To further ensure that the estimation sample is the same, we 
restrict it to 1996–2016 for the US, as policy variables for 2017 were not available for this country 
at the time of the analysis.1 Standard likelihood ratio (LR) tests on the four models above always 
reject the simpler models vis- a- vis more flexible ones.2 The ranking does not change when we 
look at penalised measures of likelihood (AIC and BIC), to take into account the large difference 
in degrees of freedom. However, as Appendix 1—Figure B1 shows, most of the increase in 
explanatory power comes from moving from m2 to m3, the saturated model, ie, by allowing for 
regional differences in period effects. Differences between m1, our baseline model, and m2, the 
hybrid model, are more modest. While Table B1 highlights the benefits, Appendix 1—Figure 
B1 depicts the costs associated with our lean specification. On the benefits side, we are able to 
identify age, cohort and policy effects. On the minus side, we lose only little explanatory power 
with respect to the hybrid model. Taken together, this reinforces our confidence in the trade- off 
1. Results for models m0, m2 and m3 are available upon request. The results for a model using the m2 
specification on common variables only are presented in Appendix D.
2. The LR test relies on asymptotic theory, which could be unsatisfactory in m3 given the high degrees of 
freedom. To be consistent with the asymptotic nature of the test we use the standard asymptotic estima-
tor, based on the observed information matrix, for the variance- covariance matrix, rather than the robust 
or sandwich estimator we use in our baseline analysis.
Figure B1 Goodness of fit, alternative models. Note: Each panel reports the log likelihood (ll) 
of the models and the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), normalised by the values achieved by 
the best fit (m3). Higher is better for ll, while lower is better for AIC. Models as in table B1. (a) 
US males, (b) UK males, (c) US females, (d) UK females.
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we have made and the strategy we have employed up to this point in estimating and presenting 
a model that captures key influences on participation.
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Appendix C
Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition
We follow Jann (2008) and decompose the difference in the linear prediction in participation 
rates — that is, in log odds — as:
 
R ≡ E (YUK)− E (YUS)
=
[
E
(
XUK
)− E (XUS)]′ βUS
+ E
(
XUS
)′ (
βUK − βUS
)
+
[
E
(
XUK
)− E (XUS)]′ (βUK − βUS)
= E + C + I  
7
The first term,  
[
E
(
XUK
)− E (XUS)]′ βUS , accounts for the difference in endowments; the 
second term,  +E
(
XUS
)′ (
βUK − βUS
)
 , accounts for the difference in coefficients, while the third 
term accounts for an interaction effect. The decomposition is viewed from the point of view of 
the US.
In order to perform this exercise, we need to adopt a common specification for the two 
countries, and use common definitions as much as possible. We therefore drop from our 
model all regional dummies, the rural indicator and the number of children for the US, and 
create dummies for home ownership and age of youngest child for the UK. We also exclude 
our health indicator at this point, as we cannot say whether the difference in the proportion 
of people with bad health in the two countries (see Table 1) is due to a true difference 
in characteristics, or reflects the difference in the way the indicator is framed. Finally, we 
are forced to drop all state- level policy variables for the US, and family policy variables at 
the national level, which have variation only for the UK. This leaves us with a very crude 
representation of the policy environment — with only minimum wage and social and family 
expenditure information, both at the national level. This is unsatisfactory, especially in the US 
where state- level policies have a great deal of variation, and changes the terms of the trade- 
off in model specification as discussed in Section 5. Hence, we opt for estimation of a model 
in the spirit of m2 (see Appendix B), with time dummies and macroeconomic (unemployment 
rate) differentials.1 Finally, we restrict our sample to 1996–2016, as social expenditure 
variables for 2017 are not available (at the moment of writing) for the US. To see whether 
the importance of covariates and coefficients has changed over time, we estimate the model 
separately for the two sub- periods 1996–2007 and 2008–2017. (The estimation results for this 
common specification are reported in Appendix D.)
Table C1a presents the results of the Oaxaca- Blinder decomposition for men, showing for 
each sub- period the contribution of endowments, coefficients, and interaction between them 
to the estimated difference in participation rates between the UK and the US. Between 1996 
and 2007, there was almost no average participation gap between the two countries, with 
the participation rate being a mere 0.14 percentage points higher. We see that composition 
effects work to lower the participation gap from a US perspective — in other words, 
“endowments” of the working- age population are more positive for participation there, so 
that predicted participation on that basis would be higher. This is almost exactly offset by 
negative behavioural effects (“coefficients”), however, which serve to widen the participation 
gap from a US perspective. These two offsetting effects underpin the almost identical levels 
of participation observed.
For the 2008–2017 period, by contrast, the average participation gap had become 
substantial, with participation more than three percentage points higher in the UK. This 
reflects the fact that the positive effect of endowments for the US (in reducing this gap) 
1. The model differs from m2 as it includes only common variables.
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fell markedly over time to effectively disappear, while the negative effect of coefficients (in 
widening the gap) also increased substantially over time (from 1.8 to 3.9 percentage points). 
Assuming interaction effects are equally attributable to both endowments and coefficients, 
endowments account for 46% of the overall deterioration in male participation rates, while 
coefficients account for the remaining 54%.
When looking at the importance of each covariate in the bottom part of the table, we 
must bear in mind that the effects of age, cohort, and period, given the inclusion of time 
dummies, are identified only up to a constant (which can be arbitrarily added to either age, 
cohort, or any combination of the two, or attributed to the dummy for the reference year). 
We therefore group together the three effects, which also include the effects of policies, 
under the heading ‘APC’. The main explanation for why composition effects were favourable 
to the US in the first sub- period, but became negligible in the second sub- period, relates 
to the education profile of the working- age population. The US started with a lower share 
of individuals with low education but the UK reduce this share faster, so that the two shares 
converged over time (as documented in Table D2 below). As far as the effects of behavioural 
are concerned, the fact that these turned increasingly against the US reflects a turnaround 
with respect to the likelihood of participation for married men, which reduced the gap in the 
earlier period but widened it in the later one, together with a reduction in the containment 
effect of age, period (including policies), and cohort, and a variety of small changes in the 
contribution of other coefficients. Changes in the effect of high education on participation, 
on the other hand, served to reduce that gap. The lower impact of home ownership on the 
propensity to participate in the US had a large effect on the participation gap throughout, 
but did not change substantially between the two periods.
The corresponding results for females are shown in Table C1b. In the 1996–2007 
period the average participation gap was again small, at only 0.17 percentage points. By 
2008–2017, the average gap had become even larger than for males, at 4.5 percentage 
points. The effect of endowments on the gap declined substantially between the two time- 
periods, reducing the gap from a US perspective by four percentage points in the earlier 
period but only one percentage point by 2008–2017. In the earlier period US women had 
an even greater advantage over their UK counterparts than men in terms of employment- 
related characteristics; by the latter period this had fallen by three- quarters though not 
disappeared. As for men, the causes of the overall deterioration in female participation rates 
are roughly equally split between endowments (again, 46%) and coefficients (54%). Similar 
to men, the main contributory factor is the spectacular reduction in the fraction of working- 
age individuals with low education in the UK, shown in Table C2. However, the increase 
in the fraction of high- educated individuals in the UK, which is stronger for females than 
for males as that table illustrates, also played a role. The effect of coefficients in widening 
the participation gap for women also increased markedly over time, doubling from 3.3 to 
6.61 percentage points; this is mainly due to a change in the overall effect of age, period 
(including policies) and cohort, which reduced the participation gap in the first period, and 
increased it in the second period.
Table C1a. Oaxaca- Blinder decomposition of the estimated US participation gap, males
Males, 16–64 1996–2007 2008–2017
UK mean 87.2% 87.8%
US mean 87.1% 84.7%
difference UK- US (pp) 0.14 3.12
of which:
endowments (pp) –1.75 –0.04
coefficients (pp) 1.83 3.86
interaction (pp) 0.06 –0.70
 Research article Labour supply and demand
Richiardi et al. International Journal of Microsimulation 2020; 13(1); 19–51 DOI: https:// doi. org/ 10. 34196/ ijm. 00211 44
Males, 16–64 1996–2007 2008–2017
endowments coefficients Endowments Coefficients
Overall (pp) –1.75 1.83 –0.04 3.86
Contribution of each covariate (pp):
APC –0.77 –1.04 –0.01 –0.25
Race black 0.78 0.46 –0.05 0.44
Race other 0.03 –0.06 0.00 –0.08
Foreign born –0.34 0.08 0.02 0.19
Foreign national –0.08 –0.23 –0.01 –0.26
Education high –0.12 –0.63 –0.04 –1.34
Education low –1.50 0.27 0.07 0.16
Household single cohab 0.61 0.01 –0.06 0.07
Household married alone –0.14 0.05 0.01 0.06
Household married cohab –0.29 –1.08 0.03 0.69
Household separated alone –0.00 –0.02 –0.00 0.09
Household separated cohab 0.02 0.01 –0.00 0.03
Household divorced alone –0.27 –0.13 0.01 0.11
Household divorced cohab 0.11 0.00 –0.00 0.08
Household widowed alone 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02
Household widowed cohab 0.00 0.00 –0.00 0.00
Household child under 2 –0.00 –0.27 –0.01 –0.25
Household child 2–4 –0.01 –0.36 –0.00 –0.28
Household child 5–9 –0.00 –0.35 –0.00 –0.38
Household child 10–15 0.07 –0.28 –0.00 –0.29
Home owned 0.16 5.41 –0.00 5.07
Unemployment rate 
difference
–0.02 –0.00 0.00 –0.00
Note: Cells with a positive (negative) contribution to the US participation gap of more (less) than one pp 
are highlighted in red (green).
Table C1b. Oaxaca- Blinder decomposition of the estimated US participation gap, females
Females, 16–60 1996–2007 2008–2017
UK mean 75.1% 78.6%
US mean 74.9% 74.0%
difference UK- US (pp) 0.17 4.54
of which:
endowments (pp) –4.05 –1.17
coefficients (pp) 3.26 6.61
interaction (pp) 0.95 –0.91
endowments coefficients endowments Coefficients
Overall (pp) –4.05 3.26 –1.17 6.61
Contribution of each covariate (pp):
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Females, 16–60 1996–2007 2008–2017
APC –0.14 –2.55 0.54 1.14
Race black –0.15 0.35 –0.11 0.34
Race other 0.01 –0.36 –0.02 –0.69
Foreign born –0.01 –0.02 –0.05 0.08
Foreign national 0.13 0.36 –0.50 0.64
Education high –0.23 0.31 1.09 –0.32
Education low –4.32 0.27 –2.47 –0.03
Household single cohab 0.30 0.06 0.56 0.10
Household married alone 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.00
Household married cohab 0.29 2.54 0.67 2.39
Household separated alone 0.01 –0.01 0.01 0.03
Household separated cohab 0.00 0.01 –0.00 0.02
Household divorced alone –0.25 –0.11 –0.15 0.12
Household divorced cohab 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.08
Household widowed alone 0.03 0.07 0.13 0.13
Household widowed cohab –0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02
Household child under 2 –0.02 –0.95 –0.51 –0.87
Household child 2–4 0.01 –1.04 –0.28 –1.08
Household child 5–9 0.02 –0.76 –0.03 –0.69
Household child 10–15 –0.00 –0.51 –0.00 –0.48
Home owned 0.23 5.51 –0.06 5.68
Unemployment rate difference –0.04 0.00 –0.01 –0.00
Note: Cells with a positive (negative) contribution to the US participation gap of more (less) than one pp are 
highlighted in red (green).
Table C2. Trends in educational attainment by gender (sample frequencies)
Male Female
US UK US UK
1996 2017 1996 2017 1996 2017 1996 2017
Education Low 0.210 0.167 0.320 0.182 0.194 0.145 0.399 0.146
Education High 0.229 0.279 0.210 0.366 0.206 0.319 0.189 0.411
Does the story change if we examine age groups separately? Tables C3a and C3b report 
the overall estimated US participation gap, and its composition in terms of the effect of 
endowments, coefficients and interaction, for males and females respectively. The estimated 
US participation gap has increased in every age group; it is well above 10 pp for the younger 
age group, and it has turned positive even for those age groups where participation rates in the 
US where initially higher than in the UK (males 50–59, females 30–39 and females 50–59). The 
only exception is for males 60–64, where the US still outperform the UK, albeit by a diminished 
margin.
Table C3a. Oaxaca- Blinder decomposition of the estimated US participation gap by age group 
and sub- periods, males
Gender Male Male Male
age group 16–19 20–29 30–39
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Gender Male Male Male
Period 1996–2007 2008–2016 1996–2007 2008–2016 1996–2007 2008–2016
overall (pp) 10.6 12.9 3.0 4.7 1.3 2.7
endowments –0.7 3.5 0.1 1.0 –0.3 0.9
Coefficients 9.3 7.3 2.4 4.7 1.6 2.3
Interaction 2.1 2.1 0.5 –1.1 0.0 –0.5
age group 40–49 50–59 60–64
Period 1996–2007 2008–2016 1996–2007 2008–2016 1996–2007 2008–2016
overall (pp) 1.0 3.2 –0.7 3.5 –4.1 –2.1
endowments –0.6 –0.2 –2.7 –0.9 –3.1 –3.9
Coefficients 1.6 4.2 1.5 4.9 –1.6 0.0
Interaction 0.0 –0.8 0.6 –0.5 0.6 1.9
Table C3b. Oaxaca- Blinder decomposition of the estimated US participation gap by age 
group and sub- periods, females
Gender Female Female Female
age group 16–19 20–29 30–39
Period 1996–2007 2008–2016 1996–2007 2008–2016 1996–2007 2008–2016
overall (pp) 13.3 13.9 1.1 3.4 –0.1 3.8
endowments 2.9 4.8 1.1 0.7 –3.0 –1.2
Coefficients 6.6 7.4 0.0 3.8 3.2 6.4
Interaction 3.9 1.7 –0.1 –1.0 –0.3 –1.4
age group 40–49 50–59
Period 1996–2007 2008–2016 1996–2007 2008–2016
overall (pp) 1.4 5.5 –2.5 4.2
endowments –5.3 –1.7 –9.4 –3.2
Coefficients 5.1 7.8 2.5 7.1
Interaction 1.7 –0.6 4.4 0.3
Appendix Figures C1 (a) and (b) offer a visual representation of the contribution of 
endowments and coefficients to the overall US participation gap. For both males and 
females, the contribution of endowments was generally negative in the period 1996–2007, 
but it has approached 0 or even turned positive in the period 2008–2016. The composition 
of the male population, which used to play in favour of the US in comparison with the UK, 
is now much more neutral. On the other hand, the contribution of coefficients is always 
positive, and generally increased over time. Behaviour increasingly plays against the US, in 
comparison with the UK.
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Figure C1 (a) Oaxaca- Blinder decomposition of the estimated US participation gap by age 
group and sub- periods, males.
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Figure C1 (b) Oaxaca- Blinder decomposition of the estimated US participation gap by age 
group and sub- periods, females.
 Research article Labour supply and demand
Richiardi et al. International Journal of Microsimulation 2020; 13(1); 19–51 DOI: https:// doi. org/ 10. 34196/ ijm. 00211 49
Appendix D
Estimated Participation Model with Common 
Specification
Table D1. Logit estimates of the probability of being in the labour force, common 
specification, males. Students excluded
(1) (2) (3) (4)
US UK US UK
M 16–64 M 16–64 M 16–64 M 16–64
VARIABLES 1996–2007 1996–2007 2008–2017 2008–2017
Age 0.094 *** 0.066 *** 0.123 *** 0.154 ***
Age squared –0.002 *** –0.002 *** –0.002 *** –0.003 ***
Year of birth 0.038 *** 0.087 *** 0.007 0.022 **
Year of birth squared 0.000 *** –0.001 *** 0.000 0.000 ***
Race black –0.583 *** –0.072 –0.480 *** –0.058
Race other –0.492 *** –0.619 *** –0.376 *** –0.489 ***
Foreign born 0.347 *** 0.408 *** 0.442 *** 0.556 ***
Foreign national 0.189 *** –0.099 *** 0.352 *** 0.067 **
Education high –13.91 6.15 –34.72 *** 22.41 *
Education low –25.92 *** 13.19 ** –2.11 35.67 ***
Year x education high 0.007 * –0.003 0.018 *** –0.011 *
Year x education low 0.013 *** –0.007 ** 0.001 –0.018 ***
Household single cohab 0.764 *** 0.817 *** 0.758 *** 0.934 ***
Household married alone 0.766 *** 1.150 *** 0.772 *** 1.253 ***
Household married cohab 1.115 *** 0.884 *** 0.941 *** 1.085 ***
Household separated alone 0.529 *** 0.387 *** 0.263 *** 0.758 ***
Household separated cohab 0.670 *** 1.358 *** 0.454 *** 1.513 ***
Household divorced alone 0.512 *** 0.310 *** 0.387 *** 0.547 ***
Household divorced cohab 0.953 *** 0.965 *** 0.694 *** 1.152 ***
Household widowed alone 0.267 *** 0.289 *** 0.072 0.359 ***
Household widowed cohab 0.455 *** 0.775 *** 0.323 ** 0.925 ***
Household child2 0.252 *** –0.235 *** 0.351 *** –0.120 ***
Household child4 0.290 *** –0.298 *** 0.288 *** –0.178 ***
Household child9 0.270 *** –0.206 *** 0.388 *** –0.126 ***
Household child15 0.349 *** –0.024 0.416 *** 0.038
Home owned 0.195 *** 1.176 *** 0.158 *** 1.026 ***
Unemployment rate diff –6.934 *** –7.906 *** –3.925 *** –4.687 ***
1996 0.034 –0.105 ***
1997 0.070 ** –0.131 ***
1998 0.063 ** –0.186 ***
1999 0.027 –0.166 ***
2000 0.044 –0.165 ***
 Research article Labour supply and demand
Richiardi et al. International Journal of Microsimulation 2020; 13(1); 19–51 DOI: https:// doi. org/ 10. 34196/ ijm. 00211 50
(1) (2) (3) (4)
US UK US UK
M 16–64 M 16–64 M 16–64 M 16–64
2001 0.022 –0.198 ***
2002 0.012 –0.192 ***
2003 –0.045 * –0.122 ***
2004 –0.078 *** –0.148 ***
2005 –0.060 ** –0.139 ***
2006 –0.018 –0.063 **
2007
2008 0.025 –0.251 ***
2009 –0.032 –0.231 ***
2010 –0.017 –0.241 ***
2011 –0.081 *** –0.184 ***
2012 –0.078 *** –0.139 ***
2013 –0.017 –0.106 ***
2014 –0.007 –0.057 *
2015 –0.015 –0.050
2016 0.006 –0.017
Observations 580,515 444,333 530,802 274,084
chi2 144,667 159,295 118,940 95,339
P 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The baseline is a medium education white individual, single and not cohabiting, who is renting. Cohort is measured subtracting 1,900 from year 
of birth.
Table D2. Logit estimates of the probability of being in the labour force, common 
specification, females. Students excluded
(1) (2) (3) (4)
US UK US UK
F 16–59 F 16–59 F 16–59 F 16–59
VARIABLES 1996–2007 1996–2007 2008–2017 2008–2017
Active
Age 0.042 *** 0.063 *** 0.110 *** 0.135 ***
Age squared –0.001 *** –0.002 *** –0.002 *** –0.002 ***
Year of birth 0.050 *** 0.059 *** –0.024 *** –0.005
Year of birth squared 0.000 *** –0.001 *** 0.000 *** 0.000
Race black 0.060 *** 0.325 *** 0.033 ** 0.223 ***
Race other –0.154 *** –0.738 *** –0.177 *** –0.771 ***
Foreign born 0.009 –0.003 0.077 *** 0.109 ***
Foreign national –0.432 *** –0.025 –0.435 *** 0.067 ***
Education high 8.42 –2.257 –53.80 *** –0.227
Education low –37.16 *** 44.29 *** –20.75 ** 0.278
Year x education high –0.004 0.001 0.027 *** 0.000
Year x education low 0.018 *** –0.023 *** 0.010 ** –0.001
Household single cohab 0.226 *** 0.433 *** 0.223 *** 0.400 ***
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
US UK US UK
F 16–59 F 16–59 F 16–59 F 16–59
Household married alone –0.084 ** 0.049 –0.037 –0.031
Household married cohab –0.317 *** 0.113 *** –0.336 *** 0.000
Household separated alone 0.093 *** 0.061 *** 0.063 ** 0.157 ***
Household separated cohab 0.037 0.616 *** –0.015 0.574 ***
Household divorced alone 0.288 *** 0.186 *** 0.152 *** 0.251 ***
Household divorced cohab 0.238 *** 0.529 *** 0.132 *** 0.421 ***
Household widowed alone –0.449 *** –0.108 *** –0.613 *** –0.084 *
Household widowed cohab –0.386 *** 0.134 –0.234 *** 0.249 *
Household child under 2 –1.158 *** –2.259 *** –0.935 *** –1.800 ***
Household child 2–4 –0.818 *** –1.871 *** –0.638 *** –1.549 ***
Household child 5–9 –0.396 *** –1.010 *** –0.337 *** –0.803 ***
Household child 10–15 –0.018 –0.425 *** –0.002 –0.319 ***
Home owned 0.267 *** 1.082 *** 0.255 *** 0.947 ***
Unemployment rate diff –4.673 *** –3.742 *** –1.904 *** –2.786 ***
1996 –0.011 –0.281 ***
1997 0.042 * –0.263 ***
1998 0.050 ** –0.242 ***
1999 0.040 * –0.199 ***
2000 0.074 *** –0.176 ***
2001 0.045 ** –0.161 ***
2002 0.017 –0.146 ***
2003 0.009 –0.147 ***
2004 –0.033 * –0.123 ***
2005 –0.049 *** –0.080 ***
2006 –0.036 ** –0.015
2007
2008 0.172 *** –0.138 ***
2009 0.171 *** –0.123 ***
2010 0.133 *** –0.123 ***
2011 0.071 *** –0.118 ***
2012 0.044 ** –0.101 ***
2013 0.051 ** –0.040
2014 0.021 –0.046 *
2015 –0.030 –0.036
2016 –0.013 –0.032
Observations 583,535 436,474 515,633 267,761
chi2 109,824 116,367 87,444 76,039
P 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The baseline is a medium education white individual, single and not cohabiting, who is renting. Cohort is measured subtracting 1,900 from year of birth.
